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:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
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:

GILBERT LORETTO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960622-CA
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
Loretto claimed in Point I of his Opening Brief that a
Ii

prospective juror's remarks during voir dire tainted the other
jurors, and the trial court erred by denying counsel's motion to
strike the panel.

During voir dire, Ms. Bingham made an

unsolicited remark where she associated Loretto's clothing and
hairstyle with a neighbor whom she believed to be a Mexican gang
member.

R. 211-12.

quash the panel.

Based on those remarks, counsel moved to

R. 271.

In response to the State's statement

that had the motion be made earlier the panel could be
questioned, defense counsel, in addition to the motion to quash,
suggested that the panel could still be questioned.
court denied Loretto's motion to quash the panel.

R. 273.
R. 275.

The

Then

the court asked the panel if anyone had been influenced by Ms.
Bingham's comment.

R. 281.

The State argues that Loretto did not preserve his claim
that the panel was tainted by Ms. Bingham's remarks for a myriad
of reasons.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE STATE'S VARIOUS ARGUMENTS ASSERTING
THAT LORETTO DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIM THAT MS.
BINGHAM'S REMARKS TAINTED THE PANEL ARE WITHOUT
MERIT
A. Loretto Preserved The Claim That Ms. Bingham's
Remarks Tainted The Panel Because She Associated
Loretto's Appearance With Mexican Gang Members.
The State claims that Loretto did not preserve the
specific argument that Ms. Bingham's remarks suggested to the
panel that he may belong to a Mexican gang.

The purpose of

preserving objections is well established:
The requirement of a specific objection on the
record ensures that the trial court will
understand the basis of the objections and have
an opportunity to correct any errors before the
case goes to the jury.
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah 1988); Utah County v.
Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983) ("[I]n order to preserve a
plea of error, the alleged error must have been raised seasonably
by counsel to the trial court . . .

to allow the trial court to

correct any error, if error there be."); Wurst v. Dep't of
Employment Sec., 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Contrary to the State's argument, it was clear that
counsel was concerned about the association Ms. Bingham made
between Loretto's appearance and her neighbor's appearance whom
she believed to be a Mexican gang member.1
x

Counsel argued that

. Ms. Bingham made the following unsolicited comment during
voir dire:
I'm a very emotional person. We live next door to
a Mexican. Still upset at them in gangs and he he dressed just like he did.
I can't
2

the clear implication of Ms. Bingham's comments was that she had
prejudice against or "concern" about her neighbor, and that she
had the same "concern" about Loretto.
a copy of the pertinent transcript.

R. 272. See Addendum A for
It is clear from the context

of Ms. Bingham's comment that her concern did not stem from a
dislike of Mexicans per se, or a simple aversion to her
neighbor's taste in clothing and hair style.

Ms. Bingham's

concern arose from her association between her neighbor's
appearance and his gang affiliation.

She then made the same

association between Loretto and her neighbor based on Lorretto's
appearance.2

Counsel made the trial court aware that it was

this comparison that tainted the panel.
The court also asked defense counsel how Ms. Bingham's
remarks about Loretto's hair tainted the panel.

R. 274.

In

response, counsel noted that the hair style was unusual, and that
Ms. Bingham had made it quite clear that to her, his hairstyle

understand. Why can't he shave that thing off the
back of his head? I'm sorry. I don't know if I
could be fair.
(The [juror] (sic) was referring
to the defendant at this point.) R. 212-13.
2

. The State also contends that Ms. Bingham's comment about
Loretto's hair was simply an expression of a general dislike of the
style. This contention conveniently ignores the context in which
her remark was made. Ms. Bingham first stated that her neighbor
was Mexican, as is Loretto. Next, she indicated that she was upset
at "them in gangs," obviously referring to her neighbor. She then
compared her neighbor's clothing style and Loretto's. In the very
next breath she commented on Loretto's hair.
Ms. Bingham was
clearly not upset because she thought her neighbor's appearance was
in bad taste. She was upset because she associated his appearance
with gang membership.
She was comparing her neighbor's appearance
with Loretto's.
In this context, it is clear that the comment
about Loretto's hairstyle was part of that comparison. R. 212-13.
3

was a "negative thing."

Counsel expressed the fear that the

other jurors would also now perceive Loretto's hairstyle as
"negative."

R. 274. Again, it is clear from the context of Ms.

Bingham's remarks that the hairstyle was "negative" because she
associated it with gang affiliation, not because it was merely
unattractive.
Counsel alerted the trial court to the fact that Ms.
Bingham's association between Loretto and Mexican gang members
based on his hair and clothing style tainted the jury.
74.

R. 272-

The motion was timely, and the basis for Loretto's objection

was clear.

It seems unlikely that the trial court somehow missed

the point.

The court had ample opportunity to address the claim

and correct the error.
B. Loretto Adequately Briefed His Claim That The
Panel May Have Identified With Ms. Bingham's Bias
Towards Loretto.
The State also argues that Appellant failed to adequately
brief his claim that the panel may have reacted to Ms. Bingham's
remarks and likewise felt some bias towards him.

It appears that

the State's contention arises from a failure to grasp Appellant's
argument rather than inadequate briefing on Loretto's part.

On

page nine of Appellant's brief, Loretto argued that Ms. Bingham's
remarks created a two fold problem:

(1) The panel heard outside

evidence; and (2) The panel may have been biased by the remarks.
For both those reasons the panel should have been struck.
Loretto maintained that the trial court's subsequent voir dire
did not render the court's error in failing to strike the panel
4

harmless for two reasons.
Brief.

See page 10 of Appellant's Opening

The error was not harmless because:

(1) The court's

questioning was not sufficient to dispel the inference of bias
raised by Ms. Bingham's remarks; and (2), The court's questioning
did not address the problem of having the jury hear outside
evidence.

See pages 8-11 of Appellant's Opening Brief.

In particular, Loretto argued that some of the jurors may
have identified with Ms. Bingham's bias towards Loretto and felt
some bias themselves.

See page 9 of Appellant's Opening Brief.

On page 10 of his brief, Loretto then maintained that the single
question asked by the court was inadequate to eliminate the taint
of Ms. Bingham's remarks.

Loretto referred this Court to cases

supporting his argument that a single question is not sufficient
to rebut an inference of bias.

See page 10 of Appellant's Brief.

Loretto then compared this case to State v. Morgan, 865 P.2d
1377, 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) where the court held that the
trial judge's extensive, individual questioning of each juror
dispelled any prejudice from a juror's inappropriate remarks.
See page 10 of Appellant's Brief.

On page 11 of his brief,

Loretto also noted that because the jurors did not know that the
case involved a question of whether Loretto was a party to a
robbery committed by two other Mexican males, they could not
adequately assess their own impartiality.
Loretto clearly defined the issues, presented supporting
case law, and argued the facts of his case.

The State

apparently did not understand that the two and half pages Loretto
5

devoted to discussing the adequacy of the court's additional voir
dire applied

to the argument that the inference of bias raised

by Ms. Bingham's remarks was not dispelled.
C. Loretto Did Not Invite Error By Indicating To
The Court That The Panel Could Still Be
Questioned About Ms. Bingham's Comments.
The State's claim that Loretto invited error by
suggesting that the trial court ask the jurors if Ms. Bingham's
comments influenced them also appears to stem from a failure to
understand Loretto's argument.

Loretto is not claiming that the

court erred by asking the panel if Ms. Bingham's remarks
influenced them.

Loretto is claiming that the court erred by

refusing to the strike the panel, and that error was not rendered
harmless by the court's subsequent question.

Therefore, Loretto

did not "lead" the court into committing an error by suggesting
that it question the panel further.
The invited error doctrine has two principal purposes.
First, the trial court should be given an opportunity to address
a claim of error.

"Second, it discourages parties from

intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a
hidden ground for reversal on appeal."

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d

1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).
In this case, defense counsel raised the question of the
panel's fitness to serve in a timely and appropriate manner.
271.

The court listened to both sides, and denied the motion.

R. 275.

The trial court did not rely on counsel's suggestion

that the court question the panel further when it denied the
6

R.

motion to quash.

It is therefore unclear how the court was

"misled" by counsel's

suggestion that if the court did not

strike the panel, it ask the jurors if they were influenced by
Ms. Bingham's remarks.
The State claims that "when the trial court asked the
question defendant requested and received no response, the trial
court legitimately concluded that it had resolved the issue."
See pg. 15 of Appellee's Brief.

It was clear to all the parties,

including the trial court, that the suggestion to question the
jurors was independent of the motion to quash the panel.

The

State failed to point out in its brief that the trial court ruled
on Loretto's motion to quash the panel before it questioned the
panel about Ms. Bingham's remarks.

R. 275.

The trial court

"resolved the issue" by denying counsel's motion, not by
questioning the jurors as the State claims.

Then it followed

both the State and defense counsel's suggestion to question the
panel.3

R. 275.

If, as the State claims, Loretto's comments

told the trial court that the additional question would alleviate
the need to quash the panel, the court would not have ruled on
the motion beforehand.

Also, nowhere in the record did defense

counsel ever state that questioning the jury was an acceptable
substitute for striking the panel.
It is obvious that defense counsel's suggestion that the
3

.
The State originally argued that the trial court could
have asked the jurors if they were biased by Ms. Bingham's remarks
but suggested that it was too late to do so. Defense counsel then
responded by suggesting that it was not too late to question the
jurors. R. 273
7

court question the jurors was in addition to the motion to quash
and was not intended as a substitute for the motion to quash
because each resulted in a different remedy.

Counsel argued

that the entire panel was tainted by Ms. Bingham's remarks.

The

remedy was to strike the whole panel and declare a mistrial.
Counsel additionally suggested that the court question the jurors
about potential bias.

Even if several jurors had subsequently

indicated to the court that they were biased by Ms. Bingham's
remarks, Loretto's remedy would be to move to strike those jurors
for cause, not to strike the entire panel.
D. Loretto's Suggestion That The Court Also
Question The Jurors About Ms. Bingham's Remarks
Does Not Preclude Him From Arguing On Appeal That
The Court's Error In Failing To Strike The Panel
Was Not Harmless.
The State claims that Loretto "defined the scope of the
voir dire" and therefore cannot complain that it was insufficient
to cure any taint.

First, the State's claim ignores the fact

that it is the trial court's duty to dispel any bias once it has
been suggested.
Ct. App. 1995).

Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 395 (Utah
Trial counsel's request that the court question

the panel to determine if anyone was influenced by Ms. Bingham's
remarks does not relieve the court of its duty.
Second, the court did not question the panel to "cure"
any error as the court had already determined that Ms. Bingham's
remarks did not bias the panel when it denied Loretto's motion to
quash.

The trial court's error in failing to strike the panel

cannot be laid at counsel's feet because the court did not "cure"
8

an error it did not perceive had occurred when it followed
counsel's suggestion that the panel be questioned further.
Lastly, it is unreasonable to suggest that if a defendant
attempts to mitigate the court's denial of his motion to quash
the panel by requesting additional voir dire, he waives any
argument that the court's error was not harmless.

Under the

State's reasoning, Loretto would have preserved his argument by
saying nothing.

But, had he said nothing, he would no doubt be

accused of inviting error by failing to request additional voir
dire.
E. Loretto Was Not Required To Renew His Motion
To Quash The Panel After The Court Questioned The
Jurors About Ms. Bingham's Remarks To Preserve
His Claim.
The State relies on Morgan to argue that Loretto tacitly
withdrew his motion to quash.
Morgan.

This case is distinguishable from

In Morgan the trial court did not rule on the

defendant's motion for a mistrial, but instead questioned the
jurors.

The defendant's failure to request a ruling was seen as

a tacit withdrawal of the motion for a mistrial.
1381.

865 P.2d at

In this case, the court already denied Loretto's motion to

quash before questioning the jurors.

It is unclear how Loretto

can be seen to have "tacitly withdrawn" a motion he had already
lost on the merits.

Loretto made his motion, stated the grounds,

and the court denied it.

The law does not require him under

these circumstances to "renew" the motion again, and risk the ire
of the trial judge.
9

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and as set forth in his initial
Opening Brief, Loretto respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the conviction and judgment entered in the trial court and
remand the case to the trial court either for a new trial, or
with orders to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
SUBMITTED this

£,5^^day

of April, 1997.

10
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

1

MR. McKINNON:

2
3
4
5

Okay.

THE COURT:

I believe that's it, is it not?

MS. REMAL:

I believe so.

THE COURT:

Mr. Blaylock, do you have any

challenges for cause?

6

MR. BLAYLOCK:

With the ones we've already

7

discussed, the first we have is No. 1, No. 2, Holly Hogarth,

8

No. 3, Helen Bingham, No. 6, Tamera Briggs.

9 I note of this here (indicating).
10
11

THE COURT:

And I'll make a]

That leaves us 22.

And that is every one so far, is that

correct?

12

MR. BLAYLOCK:

13

THE COURT:

14

Mr. Blaylock, any challenges for cause?

15

MR. BLAYLOCK:

1

^

All right.

THE COURT:

18

MR. BLAYLOCK:

9

Well, why don't we start with

defense counsel?

17

1

It is.

Do you have any?
Well, let me think about that for a|

moment.

20

THE COURT:

All right.

Ms. Remal?

21

MS. REMAL:

First of all, your Honor, I would move]

22

to strike the entire panel based on—let me think which one

23

Mrs. Bingham, No. 3 juror has been excused for cause, based

24
upon the comments that she made, and now, none of us has anw
25

W ay

of anticipating what she was going to say when she was
76

1

explaining why she was so upset.

2

But she talked about

having lost a son to suicide and then a couple of times

3

mentioned the word "prejudice".

4

And then, at some point, started talking about—it

5

wasn't clear to me even what the connection was, if any,

6

with her son's suicide, but something about, I'm still upset

7

with the Mexicans that live next door to me or in my

8

neighborhood.

9

gesturing towards him.

And she was looking at Mr. Loretto and
Saying something like, and they

10

dress like he did.

11

and kind of demonstrated the hair on the back of his neck.

12

And now that wasn't responsive to any particular question

13

It was just a comment she was making, trying to explain her

14

I

And I don't know why he doesn't cut off,

situation.

'5 I

B u t I t h i n k t h e c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n i s , is that s h e

'* '

h a s s o m e p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t or c o n c e r n a b o u t t h e n e i g h b o r s

17 I

she has.

18

have the same concern about my client, Gilbert Loretto.

19

w a s p o i n t i n g out to other

That s h e , I t h i n k , w a s t r y i n g to e x p r e s s s h e m a y

20

I

h i s m a n n e r of d r e s s .

21

I

referring

jurors h i s h a i r s t y l e a n d I g u e s s

I'm n o t e x a c t l y s u r e , but s h e w a s

to m y c l i e n t .

22

THE COURT:

He was dressed

23

M S . REMAL:

D r e s s e d o k a y , but h e d i d h a v e a

24

25

An

great.

p a r t i c u l a r h a i r s t y l e that s h e w a s o b v i o u s l y t r y i n g t o , w h e n
I

s h e d e m o n s t r a t e d k i n d of to t h e b a c k of h e r n e c k , that s h e
77

0 : "•

1

is referring to long hair at the back of the neck.

2

My concern is that she has tainted the whole panel

3

by doing that.

4

And so I would move, first of all, to strike

the whole panel for cause, for that reason.

5

I also have some specific—

6

THE COURT:

7

Before you get to these, Mr. Blaylock,

do you want to respond to that?

8

MR. BLAYLOCK:

9

Well, your Honor, if we had known

before, we could have asked the jurors that came in here how

10

those comments affected them.

I think most of them would

11

have indicated that that bothered them and that they thought

12

that she w a s — I don't think it would have influenced them in

13

any way.

14

attitude she had and the way she was acting was

15

inappropriate; but we don't know what the jury thinks

16

because we didn't ask that question.

It would have bothered them, but I think the

If we had known

I before, we could have inquired of the individuals that we
18
19

1

examined in chambers

20

THE COURT:

Ms. Remal, any final comment

21

MS. REMAL:

I guess in response to that, we could

22
3
24

25

J

certainly ask the question. We could go back out and the
Court could ask something like, You heard the comments that

J were made by Ms. Bingham, I guess that's her name, and is
'

there anybody that has been influenced in any way?

I don't

know if you want to use "influenced", or that has been
73

u

1

biased about that.

2

And then to avoid the other similar type of

3

problem, to bring them into chambers to find out what that

4

means.

5

We don't want them to say it in front of anybody

else again.

6

THE COURT:

7

problem in asking the question.

8

however, that she said anything that would prejudice

9

anything that this defendant—well, she was describing a

10

personal prejudice she has about a hairstyle and whatever

11

How would that taint the other jurors

12

MS. REMAL:

Well, I'm not sure that I have a
I don't think that,

Well, I'm afraid that the other jurors|

13

would say, gee, I hadn't noticed that hairstyle.

14

speaking of it and I noticed that, too.

15

kind of a problem.

16

what that means, or maybe they know someone of a similar

17

J style.

18

| that out to them.

Now she's

And geez, that is

That's an unusual hairstyle and wonder

They've got a problem with that.

And simply point

And certainly, she made it quite clear

1

® ' that for her, that's a negative thing.

20

I

And it seems like others are then going to be

21

particularly noticing that and maybe they will say, gee,

22

maybe I think that's negative, too.

23

whole reason why we don't want people expressing negative

I mean, that's the

24

I

opinions about defendants or witnesses or whatever, because

25

I

the rest, well, it might get them thinking as well.
79

r

-i •f

„% O

*'*' ?

1

THE COURT:

2

Mr. Blaylock, do you have any

objection if the question is asked?

3

MR. BLAYLOCK:

I have no objection.

I think the

4

Court can kind of—well, it f s already covered when the Court

5

asked if there was any particular reason they would not like]

6

to have themselves sitting on the jury.

7

THE COURT:

8

Well, I'll ask, and I think that

probably that did cover it; but I'm going to go ahead and
I ask the question and ask if Mrs. Bingham's comments in any
'

11

way, if they feel in any way that would affect their ability!
to be fair after considering her comments.

12

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, in regard to the other--

13

THE COURT:

But at this point, I'm going to deny

14
1

the motion to strike the entire panel.

^ I

16 l

Are there any others that you have?
MS. REMAL:

There are, your Honor

17

I would move to strike No. 4, Bart Rowland,

18

because he indicated that because someone is a police

19

officer, he believes that they would not lie.

20

THE COURT:

21

Before you get into that, let's take

them one at a time

22

Mr. Blaylock?

23

MR. BLAYLOCK:

24

25

I

A number of similar situations and

I don't know that they could be avoided merely because of a
person's position, he would be more credible
80
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